(Just to complement our lunchtime discussion, I wanted to take a look at a few articles)
One of the unexpected results of the study revealed that co-management benefits the wealthier people in the local community, although it is not detrimental to the poor. "In other words, the main benefits tend to trickle up to the wealthy, rather than trickle down to the poor," Dr Cinner added. "Nevertheless, most people felt that they benefitted." The team found that the institutional design of the fishery management arrangement was vital in determining whether or not people felt they benefited from co-management and were willing to work together to protect fish stocks by complying with the rules.
Fishers and scientists had been working together on the problem for some years, sharing knowledge and building trust. This led to the trialling of new co-operative models for fishery management, based on the latest that science can reveal about the state of the fish stock and the surrounding marine ecosystem. The result is a revolutionary national system of marine tenure that allocates user rights and responsibilities to collectives of fishers.
The tragedy of the commons in international fisheries: An empirical examination (Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Volume 57, Issue 3, May 2009, Pages 321–333)
The results of my ordered category estimation indicate that the probability of a fish stock being over- (under-)utilised rises (falls) with the number of countries sharing the stock. This negative effect of sharing is apparent when stocks are harvested from either large or small portions of nations’ waters, suggesting that access is all that is required to have an effect on stock status. In addition to the detrimental impact of international sharing, some economic and biological characteristics affect stock status, for example, higher valued and slower-growing stocks face further exploitation pressure.
Trying to farm a fish just because there is an established market for it is a waste of time and money, argues Mr Greenberg. Farm animals were domesticated because they were suitable to begin with, and only got more so over time. Aquaculture will only work, environmentally and economically, with the right sort of fish. So far the search has turned up two good freshwater options—tilapia and the Vietnamese Pangasius or river cobbler. A marine version may still be out there. The prize is a form of protein that is far cheaper and more efficient to produce than meat.
Fisheries provide the classic example of the tragedy of the commons, which occurs when property rights are incomplete and access to a resource is open. The migratory nature of most fish species makes it difficult to establish and protect rights to fish in the sea, so the rule of capture prevails. The result is often overexploitation of the resource. Economists long have argued that the waste associated with this problem could be reduced if we "privatized the commons," that is, created individual private property rights for common-pool resources.
The tragedy of the commons in a fishery when relative performance matters (Ecological Economics Volume 81, September 2012, Pages 140–154)
This paper presents a simple model of a common access fishery where fishermen care about relative performance as well as absolute profits. Our model captures the idea that status (which depends on relative performance) in a community influences a person's well-being. In our main specification, relative performance depends on the absolute difference in after-tax profits. We show that overharvesting resulting from the tragedy of the commons problem is exacerbated by the desire for higher relative performance, leading to a smaller steady-state fish stock and smaller steady-state profit for all the fishermen. We also consider alternative specifications where status depends on the absolute difference in harvests or relative difference in profits, or where there is heterogeneity in the degree to which status matters, or allowing for the possibility of extinction. In all these specifications, status further reduces the steady-state fish stock. We examine taxes and an individual quota as policy alternatives and find support for using the direct quantity method to implement the socially efficient stock level.